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Security Inequalities in North America: Reassessing Regional
Security Complex Theory
Abstract
This article re-evaluates earlier work done by the authors on Regional Security Complex
Theory (RSCT) in North America, using sectoral analysis initially developed by Buzan and
Waever, but also adding the variables of institutions, identity, and interests. These variables
are assessed qualitatively in the contemporary context on how they currently impress upon
the process of securitization within sectoral relations between Canada, Mexico, and the
United States. The article reviews the movement from bilateral security relations between
these states to the development of a trilateral response to regional security challenges
post- 9/11. It further addresses the present period and what appears to be a security
process derailed by recent political changes and security inequalities, heightened by the
election of Donald Trump in 2016. The article argues that while these three states initially
evinced a convergence of regional security interests after 9/11, which did create new
institutional responses, under the current conditions, divergence in political interests and
security inequalities have reduced the explanatory power of RSCT in North America.
Relations between states in North American are becoming less characterized by the role of
institutions and interests and more by identity politics in the region.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss4/
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Introduction
The topic of security inequalities in international relations has been an
ongoing discussion within academic communities for many years although
the nature of those inequalities has changed.1 During the Cold War, the focus
was on military power as the primary variable in assessing state power, as the
two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, sought to achieve a
comparative advantage in military capabilities over another.2 The formation
of security blocs, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
the Warsaw Pact are evidence of the focus on military power. These military
coalitions formed to address perceived security inequalities on each side, such
as NATO’s comparative advantage in military technological capability
compared to the Warsaw Pact’s size in number of personnel and weapons
systems. Realists such as George Kenan and Hans Morgenthau used the terms
containment and balance of power as the policy means by which states
achieved security during the Cold War, despite the security inequalities
between states.3
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the New World Order
there was less emphasis placed on military power in addressing security
inequalities between states and more of a focus on economic power and
globalization, as the policy means by which states would achieve security.4 An
anecdotal example of this occurred in 1995, when then US Secretary of
Defense William Perry convened the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas
in Williamsburg, Virginia. In his effort to gain participation by the states in
the Western Hemisphere, then Prime Minister Denzel Douglas of St. Kitts and
Nevis, asked if they would be discussing bananas. If not, he would not send

Fathali Moghaddam, The New Global Insecurity: How Terrorism, Environmental
Collapse, Economic Inequalities, and Resource Shortages Are Changing Our World
(New York: Praeger Security International, 2010); Mohammed Ayoob, “Inequality and
Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism,” International
Studies Review 4, no. 3 (December 2002): 27-48, available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.00263.
2 Economic security was also a major variable. See Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security
and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia Press 1985).
3
George Kenan, “The Sources of Soviet Power,” Foreign Affairs 25 no. 4 (July 1947);
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 1st ed.
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1948).
4 Andrew HurrellandNgaire Woods. Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics
(London,: Oxford University Press, 1999). For a more general discussion of complex
interdependency see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, 4th
ed. (New York: Longman, 2011).
1
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his Defense Minister, since economic security was the most important
concern of this small Caribbean country.5
While policy makers struggled to define mutual security concerns in the postCold War era, international relations scholars also sought new theoretical
understanding of security relationships between states. This meant moving
beyond the systemic and state-levels of analysis which dominated much of
international relations theory in the past, to discover new approaches and
variables to explain state behavior and the new global security dynamic. One
such school of thought which emerged was that of constructivism,
championed by John Ruggie and Alexander Wendt,6 which sought to move
beyond realist explanations of state behavior based on traditional elements of
national power, introducing new variables, such as culture and social
understanding.7
While the international relations academic community sought new
explanatory theories related to state behavior and security inequalities
between states in a post-Cold War era, conflict did not go away. Threats,
which had once been shaped primarily by superpower conflict and the fear of
global nuclear war become more regional and local, with the advent of failed
states and intra-state and regional conflict.8 Conflicts such as Somalia (1993),
Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999) reflected the changing dynamics of the
fragmentation of state power and military confrontation between rival ethnic

Personal observations of one of the authors, having attended the DMA in Williamsburg,
VA in 1995.
6
John Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social
Constructivist Challenge.” International Organization 52, no.4a (1998): 855-885;
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1999).
7 These are commonly referred to by the acronym DIME (Diplomacy, Information,
Military, and Economic). Alastair Ian Johnson, “Thinking about Culture,” International
Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 32-64, available at: http://www.fb03.unifrankfurt.de/45431264/Johnston-1995-Thinking-aboutStrategic-Culture.pdf; Peter
Katzenstein, ed. Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Michael Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the
Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security 23, vol. 1 (1998): 141-170,
available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.1.141. Roy Koslowski and Freidrich
Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s
Demise and the International System,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 21547, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028174; Vendulka Kubalkova,
Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert, eds, International Relations in a Constructed World
(London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998).
8
Richard Kilroy, Abelardo Rodriguez, and Todd Hataley, North American Regional
Security: A Trilateral Framework? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012)
5
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factions for political power and territory defined what was quickly becoming a
New World Disorder.

Post 9/11 Security in North America
When the terrorist attacks occurred in the United States on September 11,
2001 (9/11), challenges of asymmetrical threats, such as terrorism and
transnational criminal activity, confronted the field of international security
studies once again. Even though these threats had existed for some time, they
took on new significance as non-state actors operationalized traditional
means of attacks (airline hijackings and suicide attacks) in ways that had a
strategic effect, thus shocking the world. As a result, regional approaches
toward security relationships between states and against non-state actors
took on new significance, as states placed a greater emphasis on homeland
security and the tightening up of their respective boundaries. Old security
concepts such as perimeter defense took on new meaning in a post 9/11 world
with states, such as the United States and Russia, seeking to expand their
respective defenses by pushing security out to neighboring countries (the near
abroad in Russia’s case or North America for the United States), seeking
regional cooperation and support against new threats.9
Regionalization of security concerns, which emerged after 9/11, appeared to
give support to what Buzan and Waever called Regional Security Complex
Theory (RSCT).10 The application of their sectoral analysis in the context of
North American security integration appeared particularly prescient given the
geopolitical changes of the contemporary security environment and the new
threats posed to state security after 9/11.11 All three countries, Canada, United
States and Mexico developed new institutions across sectors (political,
economic, military, social, and environmental), which supported
securitization. The political leaders embraced shared interests in confronting
threats by proposing programs and policies, such as the Security and
Prosperity Partnership (SPP).

Richard Kilroy, “Perimeter Defense and Regional Security Cooperation in North
America: United States, Canada, and Mexico,” Homeland Security Affairs Journal,
(December 2007), available at: https://www.hsaj.org/articles/138.
10
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International
Security (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
11
Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security.
9
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Thesis Statement and Argument
Today, however, there appears to be retrenchment of nationalism and the rise
of identity politics emerging in North America, most evident with the election
of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2016. The campaign
rhetoric, which focused on immigration as the main security threat to the
United States, building a wall between the United States and Mexico, and
ending the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), is now part of
the public policy discourse in Washington, threatening to create new fissures
between countries within the region. What developed after 9/11 as an
emerging trilateral response to regional security challenges, providing
empirical support for RSCT, appears significantly impacted by security
inequalities between states and identity politics.
This article reevaluates RSCT in North America, looking at the sectoral
analysis provided by Buzan and Waever, but also adding the variables of
institutions, identity, and interests. These variables, assessed qualitatively in
the contemporary context, reflect how they currently affect the process of
securitization in sectoral relations between Canada, Mexico, and the United
States. The article reviews the movement from bilateral security relations
between these states to the development of a trilateral response to regional
security challenges post- 9/11. It further addresses the present period and
what appears to be a security process derailed by recent political changes and
security inequalities, heightened by the election of Donald Trump in 2016.
The article argues that while these three states initially evinced a convergence
of regional security interests after 9/11, which did create new institutional
responses, under the current conditions, divergence in political interests and
security inequalities have reduced the explanatory power of RSCT in North
America. Relations between states in North American appear less
characterized by the role of institutions and interests and more by identity
politics in the region.

Regional Security Complex Theory Explained
Buzan and Waever define a regional security complex as “a set of units whose
major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked
that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart
from one another.”12 In an earlier work, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde
proposed an approach to security analysis that broke down the whole into five
sectors used for security analysis: the military sector, the environmental
Buzan and Waever, Regions and Power, 44.

12
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sector, the economic sector, the societal sector, and the political sector.13 By
using the term securitization, Buzan et al., effectively argued that security was
too broad a concept defined purely in military terms alone: it is best viewed
across multiple sectors of both the state and society, where the state alone
does not hold a monopoly of either power or influence on security. Yet,
securitization, as used by Buzan et al., has its critics, who argue that by
broadening the definition of security, they have in fact weakened it, to the
point that anything can be securitized and thus impact state security.14 What
then is neglected is what states actually do to operationalize security.
Yet, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde argue that their views on securitization
involve three steps, which prevent everything from becoming a security issue:
identification of existential threats emergency action and effects on inter-unit
relations by breaking free of rules.15 The problem, however, is that not all
threats are existential to all states, and therefore states perceive of threats
differently, requiring different sets of emergency action and different
responses from both public and private sectors. Thus, the sectoral analysis
offered by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde do provide a means by which
securitization can be disaggregated from the whole to examine specific areas
of concern where cooperation or conflict (amity or enmity) can occur between
states. In developing RSCT in their later work, Buzan and Waever make the
argument that it is in fact these inter-unit relations between states that are
most applicable regionally and by examining each sector, a larger picture
occurs of what regional security cooperation takes place across borders (or
not: thus, desecuritization may occur).

Other Views on Regional Security Relationships
Buzan and Waever may have developed RSCT, but they are not alone in
seeking a theoretical understanding of regional interaction between states
regarding security. David Lake and Patrick Morgan suggest security is simply
one important variable that drives the development of regional orders, but
certainly not the only one.16 Their idea of regional orders approximates Buzan
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for
Analysis. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 8.
14
Amir Lupovici, “The Limits of Securitization Theory: Observational Criticism and the
Curious Absence of Israel,” International Studies Review 16, no. 3 (September 2014):
390-410, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/misr.12150; Rita Taurek, “Securitization
Theory and Securitisation Studies,” Journal of International Relations and Development
9 (2006): 53-61, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800072.
15
Buzan, et al., Security: A New Framework, 6.
16
David Lake and Patrick Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World.
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
13
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and Waever’s security complexes; however, Lake and Morgan take a much
more inclusive view of what constitutes a region, whereas Buzan and Waever
are much more exclusive, arguing that regions are clearly defined.17 Lake and
Morgan also make the argument that, “Regions behave differently than the
international system, thus new approaches and new theories are necessary to
fully understand regional security dynamics” and “Regions provide a new
dynamic for great powers and therefore traditional foreign policy approaches
to regional conflicts may no longer be appropriate. Great power foreign policy
must be designed to suit the region.”18 Thus, the idea of security inequalities
between a powerful state (United States) and less powerful states (Canada
and Mexico) affects the relations between these states, regionally, in North
America.
According to Buzan and Waever, North America (comprised of Canada,
Mexico, and the United States) would fit their definition of an RSCT since it
possesses all four of the criteria necessary:
1.
2.
3.
4.

A boundary dividing regional neighbors.
Anarchic structure of two or more autonomous units.
Polarity defining the distribution of power among units.
A socially constructed understanding of amity and enmity among
the units.19

In addition, the security environment and threats that emerged after 9/11,
which had a direct impact on the United States, also affected Canada and
Mexico, due to their shared borders. As one former Canadian military officer
once stated, “if your neighbor’s house is on fire, you can sit and watch it burn
and hope it doesn’t spread to your house, or you can grab a hose and help him
put it out, which also protects your home.”20

A Regional Security Complex in North America
As a result of the events of 9/11 and the focus placed by the United States on
homeland security, both Canada and Mexico took a number of steps across
Lake and Morgan, 30; Buzan and Waever, Regions and Power, 48-50.
Lake and Morgan, Regional Order, 6-7.
19Buzan and Waever, Regions and Power, 53.
20 This comment was shared at the Kingston Conference on International Security,
Ontario, Canada (June 11-12, 2009). Interestingly, a Mexican military officer attending
the conference made another comment about increased security cooperation between
Canada and Mexico. He stated that Mexico would be open to more security cooperation
with Canada; however, there was this large thing in between their two countries (Personal
observations of the authors who attended this event).
17
18
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Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s sectors (military, economic, social,
environmental, and political) to increase security cooperation with the United
States. Both states recognized that US insecurity influenced the much broader
regional context for their collective relations. Most of these actions occurred
bilaterally, rather than trilaterally, for example, Canada and the United States
or Mexico and the United States. However, in sectors where trilateral
relations already existed, the discourse necessarily took on a trilateral
dimension. An example of this would be the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, which
went into effect in 1994. Yet, NAFTA did not create institutions like those,
which emerged in Europe with the formation of the European Union (EU)
and a regional governance model. Rather NAFTA was a loose economic
governance model which, after 9/11, became more securitized and more
reflective of a ‘hierarchical sovereignty’ (as defined by Lake and Morgan),
rather than a ‘pooled sovereignty’ model of institution building.21

Sectoral Analysis
Within the political sector, a number of institutional changes took place in
North America. The largest restructuring of the US government since 1947
occurred in 2002 under the Homeland Security Act, which established the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This new cabinet-level agency,
which has grown to over 240,000 members, consolidated a number of federal
agencies, which had previously been under other cabinets, such as the US
Coast Guard, which had been part of the Department of Transportation.22 The
Department of Homeland Security also included new agencies, such as the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Canada followed suit in 2003
by creating its own homeland security agency, Public Safety Canada (PSC).Its
mission mirrored that of the DHS, “to ensure coordination across all federal
departments and agencies responsible for national security and the safety of
Canadians. Our mandate is to keep Canadians safe from a range of risks such
as natural disasters, crime, and terrorism.”23 Mexico did not create a new
political institution to match that of DHS or PSC. Instead, it created a Public
Security Department (discontinued in 2013) which focused on internal
security issues related to policing and crime. Mexico did not have a national
21Greg

Anderson, Securitization and Sovereignty in Post-9/11 North America, Review of
International Political Economy 19, no. 5 (2012): 1–31, available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2011.600239.
22Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2016). “About DHS,” available at:
https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs.
23
Public Safety Canada (PSC) “About Public Safety Canada,” (2016), available at
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/index-en.aspx.
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security strategy before 9/11, and did not create one immediately afterwards
during the Fox Administration (2000-2006) which would drive changes in
bureaucratic structures focused on security. As a result, Mexico had an
incomplete national security law in 2005, lacking a new department, which
could address homeland security issues. Although the Fox Administration
inaugurated the office of National Security Advisor, this office went
unregulated by law and had many political and bureaucratic problems in
forming a national security cabinet, or a means by which there was a clear
coordination between national security and foreign policy. Thus, after 9/11,
“the Mexico government experienced a political, conceptual, and institutional
vacuum and was unable to coordinate, plan, and administer resources of the
state in order to cooperate effectively with the United States.”24 In the end,
after 2005, the coordination between the United States and Mexico on North
American security concerns took place between the Ministry of the Interior
and the Department of Homeland Security.25
Within the military sector, a similar dynamic occurred with the United States
creating a new homeland defense command, US Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) in 2002, which would coordinate US military support to
the federal government in response to threats within North America.
USNORTHCOM became the country’s sixth regional command, responsible
for the territorial defense of North America, to include Canada and Mexico (as
well as the Bahamas, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands), under its Area
of Responsibility (AOR).26 Canada also stood up Canada Command in 2006,
which had a similar homeland continental defense mission to
USNORTHCOM. Canada and the United States were already part of military
alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as
the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). USNORTHCOM took
over operational responsibility of NORAD from the old US Space Command,
with its new headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. Again,
Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security, 109.
Interview of one of the authors with the former Minister of the Interior, Santiago Creel
Miranda, Mexico, City, August 12, 2015. Mexico produced a National Security Program
document under the Calderon administration (2006-2012) and later under Peña Nieto
(2012-2018). The latest is the “National Security Program 2014-2018: A
multidimensional policy for Mexico in the 21st century,” available at:
http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5342824&fecha=30/04/2014. The
problem is that Mexico does not yet have a doctrinal conception of national security
beyond the sexenio (6-year term) of the administration in office.
26
“About NORTHCOM,” (n.d.), available at: http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM/; The other five regional commands include: US Central Command
(Middle East); US Southern Command (Central/South America and Caribbean); US
Africa Command (Continental Africa); US European Command (Eurasia, to include
Russia); and US Pacific Command (rest of Asia, China, and the western Pacific).
24
25
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Mexico did not follow suit, initially, under the Fox administration, despite
NORTHCOM’s efforts to involve Mexican military personnel in both NORAD
and NORTHCOM structures. This would later change under the Calderon
administration. Thus, using Buzan’s terms, while there was amity between the
United States and Canadian militaries before and after 9/11, the enmity that
existed between the United States and Mexican militaries remained after 9/11,
although this did vary by institutions.27
Within the economic sector, the NAFTA framework provided the institutional
context by which the three countries addressed security concerns. The impact
of 9/11, where all commercial airline traffic into and out of the United States
was completely stopped on that day, had a spillover effect on Canada and
Mexico as flights from overseas were diverted to airports in these countries.
Events on 9/11 also affected commercial vehicular traffic across land borders,
which had the effect of creating significant back-ups of finished goods,
agricultural products, and supply parts. There were even discussions between
government officials on how each country would respond to the threat of a
terrorist incident at a critical border-crossing site, or the spillover effects of a
bioterrorism incident or pandemic on each country’s health systems.28 Having
the consultation mechanisms in place with NAFTA, as well as institutional
structures, which facilitated trade and commerce between Canada, Mexico,
and the United States, allowed for a discussion of new security concerns
raised by the events of 9/11 within the economic sector with the goal to
increase security without creating severe restrictions on trade and commerce.
Examples of security measures in the economic sector after 9/11 included
such program as the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT); Free and Secure Trade (FAST); and NEXUS.29
Securitization within the environmental sector includes issues such as water
rights, climate change, and health issues among others. The United States has
As one anecdotal example, during a presentation in Mexico City in 2009, the authors a
Mexican Army officer confronted the authors. He was upset with USNORTHCOM’s
patch, worn on US military uniforms, which showed the US eagle sitting on top of
Mexico, Canada, and the United States. He also questioned that stationing of the US 1st
Armored Division in El Paso, Texas, after its drawdown from Europe, arguing that it was
there as an invasion force. While the Mexican Army has always been more nationalistic,
the Mexican Navy has been more cooperative in working with its North American
counterparts. In fact, the Mexican Navy provided a liaison officer to USNORTHCOM
headquarters years before the Army finally sent its own liaison officer.
28 An example was a conference held in San Antonio, Texas in November 2006, with the
theme “Catastrophic Terrorism at the Border, Preparing for and Responding to Disasters
in North America,” sponsored by US Northern Command which included government,
military, and academic officials from all three countries.
29 Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security, 114.
27
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bilateral treaties with Mexico and Canada with regard to shared waterways
and access to water resources. The International Boundary Waters Treaty
between the United States and Canada has been in existence since 1909,
creating an International Joint Commission (IJC) to oversee shared water
resources along the border.30 Similarly, the International Boundary and
Water Commission exist to regulate binational water resources between
Mexico and the United States, based on a treaty negotiated in 1944.31 More
recently, concerns over the impact of climate change, particularly in the Arctic
region caused the United States, Canada, and other Arctic countries to
confront a changing geographic and environmental landscape due to the
melting polar ice cap and increased access to fishing, minerals, as well as
commercial transit in this region.32 Pandemic flu, such as the swine flu
epidemic in 2009 and other communicable diseases such as the Zika virus in
2016 affect countries in North America and throughout the Western
Hemisphere. Information sharing between Mexico, the United States, and
Canada help prevent the spread of these infectious diseases, along with the
actions of local communities working across the border to address to address
shortcoming in their public health infrastructure.33
The societal sector incorporates identity issues, which have a security
dimension at the sub-state level.34 Examples would include migration,
Diasporas, and conflict between various ethnic groups or cultures. States,
which share common borders, will always face some degree of social stress
related to immigration policies, work and transit issues, economic and
political interaction, and other cross-border dynamics.35 For the United
States, Mexico, and Canada, the rise in international criminal gangs, engaging
in drug and human trafficking, arms trafficking, and illegal trade and
smuggling, have taken on new social implications since 9/11, due to fears of
International Joint Commission (ICJ), “Role of the IJC,” (2016), available at:
http://www.ijc.org/en_/Role_of_the_Commission.
31 Nicole T. Carter, Clare Ribando Seelke, and Daniel T. Shedd, U.S.-Mexico Water
Sharing: Background and Recent Developments, Report No. R43312 (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service January 2015): available at:
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=762038.
32 James Kraska and Betsy Baker, Emerging Security Issues in the Arctic,” (Center for a
New American Security, March 2014), available at:
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/178414/CNAS_EmergingArcticSecurityChallenges_polic
ybrief.pdf.
33 Kraska and Baker; One example shared at the conference was the cooperation between
public health officials in Laredo, Texas and Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, Mexico to
confront pandemics which could impact their border communities. As early as 2006,
meetings were taking place to discuss how these two cities would address their public
health needs and ability to share resources to address such a threat.
34Buzan, et al., Security: A New Framework, 119.
35 Thus, the development of border studies as its own academic discipline.
30
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terrorist groups taking advantage of these criminal networks, as well as
migrant Diasporas, to gain access to their respective countries.36 Cultural and
identity issues also affected the desire on the part of USNORTHCOM to
expand its bilateral security relationship with Canada in NORAD to include
Mexico in new formal security relationships, which went beyond air defense,
to maritime and land-based military institutions. Language differences,
intelligence-sharing agreements, and a difference in military cultures and
organizational structures made such efforts difficult, if not impossible to
overcome.37
Yet in 2011, a new conference organized by the Mexican Navy’s Center for
Advanced Naval Studies (War College), evinced a new sense of cooperation
between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The new NORTHCOM
commander, Admiral James Winnefield, Jr. arrived in Mexico City with a
more conciliatory tone and approach toward military-to-military cooperation
in the context of the North American region as a whole. He went further than
did his predecessors in advocating more structural cooperation with Mexico
and Canada referring to shared interests along their common borders with
the United States, particularly in dealing with common threats such as
organized crime and natural disasters. The Mexican government and military
officials positively received his message; however, the Mexican Army
remained skeptical.38 Four years later, a conference organized by US Special
Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) in Colorado Springs, Colorado,
brought together Canadian, Mexican, and US military and civilian personnel
to discuss trilateral cooperation amongst Special Operations Forces (SOF) to

A number of news articles in the Washington Times, International Business Journal,
Judicial Watch, and other media raised the fears of terrorists taking advantage of the
porous border with Mexico and Canada to enter the United States, possibly as Syrian
refugees. See Stephan Dinan, “Agents nab Pakistanis with Terrorist Connections Crossing
U.S. Border,” Washington Times, (December 30, 2015), available at:
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/30/pakistanis-terroristconnections-nabbed-us-border/?page=all; However, for years, the Department of
Homeland Security argued that such fears were overstated, and that no terrorists had
been identified crossing the border. After the San Bernardino, CA terrorist attack in
December 2015 where the suspects had ties to ISIS, more scrutiny has been placed on
migration, both legal and illegal.
37 In 2010, a conference hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.
brought together senior military leaders from the United States, Canada, and Mexico, to
discuss increased security cooperation between the three countries. The commander of
US Northern Command, Air Force General Victor Renuart tried to convince his
colleagues of the need for further integration and cooperation under USNORTHCOM’s
leadership; however, he received a rather cool reception (Personal observation of the
authors who organized this conference).
38 Personal observation of one author who was responsible for organizing this conference.
36
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confront the growing threat of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) within
North America.39
The sectoral approach offered by Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde and later
expanded upon by Buzan and Weaver in developing RSCT, does provide a
useful theoretical lens and typology for addressing securitization both
internally within states and externally within regions. The addition of the
variables of identity, institutions, and interests provides an increased
understanding of how states within regions securitize issues differently and
why certain sectors have more or less salience in understanding RSCT’s value
in explaining security inequalities.40

Operationalizing RSCT in North America
After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, Canada and the United States redefined
their security relationship, building on existing treaties and institutions. In
December 2002, both countries formed a Bi-National Working Group (BWG)
to explore areas of security cooperation that would extend beyond the current
NORAD institutional structure (focused on air defense) to include both a
maritime and terrestrial defense component. The BWG also addressed issues
such as “enhanced intelligence and information sharing, interagency
cooperation, better situational awareness, and border security.”41
As mentioned previously in this article, despite efforts by the United States to
reach out to Mexico and create more formal security cooperation ties between
the two nations’ militaries, Mexico did not initially reciprocate. The Mexican
Navy did agree to send a liaison officer to USNORTHCOM headquarters;
however, the Mexican Army did not.42 One of the reasons for the lack of
cooperation was the different threat perceptions at the time. For the United
William Mendel and Peter McCabe, SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized
Crime (McDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2016).
40Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security, 18.
41 Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security, 111; What many people do not know
is that on 9/11, the operational commander of NORAD was Canadian General Rick
Findley, the Battle Commander at the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, since the
US NORAD Commander, Air Force General Ralph Eberhart, was at Peterson AFB
Colorado Springs, Colorado (personal conversations of one of the authors with Bilateral
Working Group members).
42 There is one Mexican Army representative now. Under Calderon and Peña Nieto
military to military cooperation has increased greatly. See CG. DEM Almirante José
Santiago Valdés Álvarez, Secretaría de Marina-Armada de México, Jefe del Estado Mayor
“Límites y alcances de la cooperación military en América del Norte,” in Abelardo
Rodríguez (coordinador) Agendas Comunes y Diferencias en la seguridad de América
del Norte, ¿de dóndevenimos?,¿dóndeestamos?y ¿a dóndequeremosir? (Centro de
EstudiosSuperioresNavales de la Armada de México, Universidad de Guadalajara, 2012).
39
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States, the threat was terrorism. For Mexico, the principal threat was
organized crime. Thus, the United States looked to expand its security
perimeter to prevent terrorists from attacking the homeland from without,
while Mexico was more concerned with internal security, looking at the
criminal threat within the country. These two divergent views on what
constituted the main threat to each country were further exacerbated by the
United States placing most of its emphasis on using the military to fight a
Global War on Terrorism, rather than pursuing a criminal justice model to
counter terrorism. Such a model would have placed more emphasis on law
enforcement cooperation between police agencies rather than militaries.43
Interestingly, Canada and Mexico did increase ties in law enforcement
cooperation due to a shared security problem: organized crime and tourism.
Through the efforts of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), working
with both federal and state police forces in Mexico, both countries overcame
an impasse in jurisdiction issues to allow for the sharing of law enforcement
sensitive information and cooperation in criminal investigations involving
Canadian citizens who were victims of criminal violence in Mexico.44 Mexican
government officials also expressed interest in having RCMP assistance with
developing a community-policing model, as well as support in their attempts
to make the legal process in Mexico more transparent.45

Security and Prosperity Partnership
A major development in creating a trilateral security relationship in North
America occurred in March 2005, when the leaders of Canada (Paul Martin),
Mexico (Vicente Fox), and the United States (George W. Bush) met in Waco,
Texas to sign an agreement called the Security and Prosperity Partnership
(SPP). Although officially called the North American Leaders’ Summit, the
initial meeting in Waco (primarily being pushed by George W. Bush), came to
Jason Rinehart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Perspectives on
Terrorism 4, no. 5, (November 2010): 31-47, available at:
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122/html. The
Mexican military has had more of an internal security role, which it uses to augment
police forces in responding to internal threats; whereas both the United States and
Mexican have legal restrictions on the use of the military domestically.
44 Jeff Sallot, “RCMP to Join Investigation, Mexico says,” The Globe and Mail, March 4,
2006, available at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/rcmp-to-joininvestigation-mexico-says/article18157565/.
45 The authors attended a meeting, which took place in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico in 2009,
where the state attorney general from Chihuahua voiced these concerns to an RCMP
official. Mexico was beginning to experiment with the use of oral testimony in its legal
procedures, which would be a significant change in transparency of its jurisprudence and
court system.
43
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be called the Three Amigos summit by the press, due to the emphasis placed
on the meeting as a gathering of friends rather than competitors.46 Canadians
and Americans alike viewed SPP skeptically, believing it was a cover for
ushering in a North American Union, under a shroud of secrecy.47 Ironically,
Canadians viewed it as a loss of sovereignty to the United States, while
American citizens viewed it as a loss of sovereignty to Mexico, and Mexico as
well viewed it as a loss of sovereignty to both nations.48
Yet, the SPP did seek to address some of the security inequalities between
states in North America by creating a governing structure, which would allow
all three countries to have a seat at the table to discuss issues related to the
SPP’s main five main agenda items.
1. Creation of a North American Competitiveness Council
2. Advancing cooperation on avian and pandemic influenza
3. North American Energy Security Initiative
4. North American Emergency Management
5. Smart, Secure Borders.49
Both Martin and Fox recognized that Bush’s main goal for the SPP was to
provide a unified North American security agenda focused on the threat of
international terrorism. Canada and Mexico, while focused on the prosperity
aspects of the SPP, realized that their economic relations with the United
States needed to address United States insecurity since 9/11. By emphasizing
areas of cooperation that would promote common border security issues,
infrastructure protection (particularly in energy), and emergency response,
the SPP did address some of the main threats to North America from
terrorism. The working groups created to address such issues also had a
prosperity dimension since they also addressed regulatory cooperation to
promote economic growth and improve quality of life for citizens on both
Subsequent meetings between new leaders of each country become much more
contentious over differences in trade policies, in particular. Bruce Cheadle, “Three
Amigos summit not so chummy: Harper, Obama Spar Over Trilateral Trade,” Winnipeg
Free Press, April 3, 2012), available at:
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/canada/three-amigos-summit-not-so-chummy145886435.html.
47 Laura Carlson, Extending NAFTA’s Reach, (Petrolia, CA: Center for International
Policy, 2007). Available at: https://www.counterpunch.org/2007/08/25/extendingnafta-s-reach/.
48 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), “Security and Prosperity Partnership:
Myths and Facts,” (2007). Available at: http://www.spp.gov/myths_vs_facts.asp.
49Sourcewatch, “Security and Prosperity Partnership,” (2005), Available at:
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Security_and_Prosperity_Partnership_
of_North_America.
46
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sides of shared borders. Thus, in the end, the SPP reflected a recognition that
all three countries were part of a shared security complex. The securitization
of issues across multiple sectors (political, economic, environmental, social,
and military) needed to be addressed in some comprehensive framework,
which did address the interests of all three states, and not the agenda of just
one dominant state.
Despite the good intentions of the SPP, there were still some identity issues,
which proved hard to overcome. The working groups themselves were
dissimilar with each country’s participants reflecting diverse interests and
agendas. Some of the participants in each country’s bureaucracy also voiced
skepticism about whether they were pursuing common interests over
parochial ones.50 At the same time, those outside of the government voiced
concern over the transparency of the negotiations, “criticizing the secretive
and exclusionary nature of discussions, and the apparent privileging of
business interests through the creation of the North America Competitiveness
Council (NACC).”51 Supporters of the SPP even had reservations based on the
decision-making model adopted by the SPP, arguing that
“the SPP has been a failure in two important respects: its limited
transparency has fueled conspiracy theories that hold the SPP is a plot
to reduce national sovereignty in each country; and it has failed to
allay public concerns, mainly in the U.S., that NAFTA has hurt U.S.
[sic] prosperity more than it has helped–despite the ample economic
data which provides evidence to the contrary.”52
Less than six months after signing the SPP in Waco, Texas, a major hurricane
affected the Gulf Coast of the United States in August 2005, causing
significant loss of life and property damage primarily in Mississippi and
Louisiana. The city of New Orleans alone suffered 1800 casualties and $110
billion in damages.53 Critics assailed the Department of Homeland Security
and its subordinate Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for

Personal conversations of one of the authors with working group members involved in
the SPP process.
51 Kilroy, et al., North American Regional Security, 130.
52 Christopher Sands, A Vote for Change and U.S. Strategy for North American
Integration, (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute2008), available at:
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/PNA_NA_Policy_Brief_1_A_Vote_for_Cha
nge.pdf.
53Hurricane Katrina Relief, “FAQs,” (2011), available at:
http://www.hurricanekatrinarelief.com/index.html.
50
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their poor response to the natural disaster.54 One of the reasons they were ill
prepared to respond to this environmental threat, was due to the stand-up of
DHS and the implementation of new programs, such as the National
Response Plan and the National Incident Management system, which were
primarily a response to the threat of terrorism following 9/11.55 The lack of
communication and coordination of relief efforts at the local, state, and
federal levels exposed serious flaws in the ability of the United States to
respond to a natural disaster of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina.
Compounding the problem was the impact of Hurricane Rita, less than 30
days later, which impacted almost the same Gulf states; however, this time
the oil-refining areas of Texas bore the brunt of the damage. The result was a
significant effect on a part of the United States, which “produced
approximately 29 percent of all domestic oil production and 47 percent of the
nation's 17 million barrels a day refining capacity.”56
Since Emergency Management was one of the five main agenda items of the
SPP, the United States, Canada, and Mexico were already beginning to
coordinate efforts on how each country could contribute to a trilateral
response to disasters in North America (albeit the initial focus was on
terrorist-created disasters). Yet, institutional mechanisms to operationalize
responses were beginning to be put in place between the militaries of each
country, such that the Canadian navy even sent ships to support search and
rescue and relief and recovery operations before the Canadian government
authorized the mission.57 Even the Mexican Navy and Army responded by
providing personnel and equipment to south Texas to support many of the
displaced persons from New Orleans. Mexican President Vicente Fox stated,
“these humanitarian missions reflect the Mexican people's feelings of
solidarity with the US population.”58
Mike Ahlers, “Report: Criticism of FEMA's Katrina response deserved.” CNN, April 14,
2006, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/14/fema.ig/.
55 See Richard J. Kilroy, Jr., ed. Threats to Homeland Security: An All-Hazards
Perspective (Hoboken: J. Wiley and Sons, 2008).
56 Charles Herman, “Katrina's Economic Impact: One Year Later.” ABC News, August 25,
2006, available at:
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/HurricaneKatrina/story?id=2348619&page=1.
57 Personal conversations of one of the authors with Canadian military personnel.
58 Vicente Fox, “President Fox Sends New Message about Disaster Caused by Hurricane
Katrina,” Presidency of the Republic, (September 5, 2005), available at:
http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/en/activities/speeches/?contenido=20654&pagina=1.
Yet, despite Mexico’s willingness to provide support, it was much more difficult to
coordinate the actual movement of Mexican military personnel and equipment into the
United States, than it was to accommodate Canada’s efforts. For example, Mexican
military medical personnel were initially not given permission to provide medical
support, as well as food products brought into the United States to be used by Mexican
military field feeding teams were not cleared through customs (Personal conversations of
54
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When the Three Amigos met in Guadalajara, Mexico in 2009, each country
had new elected leaders Felipe Calderon (Mexico), Stephen Harper (Canada),
and Barack Obama (United States). As a result, the original five agenda items
of the SPP changed to three:
1. Common Prosperity: Increase trade not restrict it; Legal migration;
Clean energy
2. Common Safety and Security: H1N1 cooperation; Defeat drug
cartels; Control flow of arms
3. Common Values: Peace; Democracy; Human rights.59
Mexico’s drug wars and the rise of criminal gang violence dominated the
security dimension of the meeting. The United States wanted Mexico’s
support in providing more stringent drug trafficking measures to reduce the
flow of drugs into the United States. Mexico wanted the United States to stem
the flow of arms into Mexico. Canada was also experiencing the effects of the
growing problem of transnational crime in the hemisphere. Despite the
Obama administration’s continued support for the Merida Initiative, begun
by George W. Bush, there was a pessimistic tone to the meeting.60 The
positive results of trilateral security cooperation fostered by the events
surrounding Hurricane Katrina had given way to a more harsh reality that
each country faced its own problems that could best be resolved internally or
at a minimum, bilaterally. Thus, in 2010, the North American Leaders’
Summit was cancelled. Instead, Prime Minister Harper and President Obama
met in 2011 and agreed to a new bilateral security policy titled, “Beyond the
Border,” focusing on security and economic cooperation between Canada and
the United States.61 This bilateral agreement signaled that the Security and

one of the authors with US NORTHCOM personnel responsible for coordinating with
Mexican military units).
59 White House, “Joint Statement by North American Leaders,” Guadalajara, Mexico,
(August 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Jointstatement-by-North-American-leaders/.
60 The Merida Initiative was a US $1.5 billion support package to Mexico over three years,
to fight the growing threat of drug trafficking organizations. Critics of the program called
it Plan Mexico, a reference to US. Plan Colombia counterdrug policy in Colombia, which
involved a direct US military intervention.
61 Border Action Plan, “Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and
Economic Competitiveness,” Government of Canada, (February 4, 2011), available at:
http://www.borderactionplan-plandactionfrontalier.gc.ca/psec-scep/declarationdeclaration.aspx?lang=eng.
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Prosperity Partnership, begun in 2005, was dead, although members of the
Mexican Foreign Service argued that there was never a funeral.62

The Merida Initiative and Military Cooperation
The United States and Mexico continued to develop stronger security ties,
funneling Merida Initiative funding primarily toward improved Mexican
military capabilities, to include enhanced intelligence sharing between the
two countries, coordinated out of the US Embassy in Mexico City. However,
as Mexico’s military took a more visible role in combating drug trafficking
organizations, so too did the human rights record of the military come under
greater scrutiny. United States military leaders had been warned about the
possible danger of drawing closer to the Mexican military, not only due to the
historical antagonism that existed between the two countries, but also due to
the extent that the Mexican military had its own problems with corruption
and ties to drug trafficking.63 Despite such warnings the US military, under
US Northern Command’s leadership, engaged in a number of direct and
indirect support missions to help train and equip the Mexican military to
combat drug trafficking organizations, to include intelligence sharing. The
Mexican military, primarily the Marines, have had the most success in
capturing or killing key leaders of Mexico’s drug cartels, to include the head of
the Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquín (El Chapo) Guzmán Loera.64 However, whatever
success the military achieved in combating the drug cartels, was offset by the
negative publicity surrounding the human rights violations perpetrated
primarily by the Mexican Army and Federal Police Forces. The most
egregious case remains unresolved, where 43 college students in Ayotzinapa
died in 2014, reportedly murdered by drug cartels. Yet, evidence implicates a
government cover-up and Mexican security forces complicity in the crime.65
Personal observations based on interviews conducted by one of the authors with
Mexican foreign service members.
63 As one example, in 1995, President Clinton tapped the Commander of US Southern
Command, General Barry McCaffrey, to become his new Director of the Office of National
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). McCaffrey travelled with Secretary of Defense, and
William Perry to meet with Mexican counterparts, to include Mexico’s drug czar, General
Jose Gutierrez Rebollo. Despite a briefing by his staff on corruption and collusion of the
Mexican military with drug trafficking, General McCaffrey called General Rebollo
“someone he could do business with.” Less than a year after than meeting, General
Rebollo was arrested on drug trafficking charges (Direct personal involvement of one of
the authors with General McCaffrey and his staff at US Southern Command).
64Azam Ahmed, “How El Chapo Was Finally Captured, Again.” New York Times, January
16, 2016, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/americas/mexicoel-chapo-sinaloa-sean-penn.html?_r=0.
65 Ed Vulliamy, “One Year Ago, 43 Mexican Students Were Killed. Still, There are no
Answers for Their Families.” The Guardian, September 19, 2015, available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/20/mexico-43-killed-students-; See
62
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The movement from a trilateral framework for security cooperation in North
America to a series of bilateral relationships, in and of itself, would not
necessarily discredit the application of RSCT. The sectoral analysis offered by
Buzan and Waever still has explanatory value in understanding how the
process of securitization can take place in different spheres of influence. For
example, the environmental security cooperation that took place between
Canada, Mexico, and the United States during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was
also evident in 2009, when the swine flu pandemic affected Mexico. There
was a high level of communication and cooperation between health
organizations in efforts to control and contain the spread of the disease.66 Yet,
the other variables of Identity, Interests, and Institutions do take on increased
significance in understanding the limitations of RCST in understanding the
changes that have taken place more recently in North America, particularly in
the political and social sectors. Also, these variables can help explain the
security inequalities, which continue to shape relations between states,
particularly within specific geographic regions, such as North America, to
include its geographic and environmental context, for example, shared
airspace, oceans, borders, proximity, and threats).

New Dynamics in Security Relations in North America and
RSCT
On June 29, 2016, the Three Amigos met once again, this time in Ottawa,
Canada, at the North American Leader’s Summit, to discuss ways in which the
three countries can increase cooperation on issues of interest to the three
countries. Concerning Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde’s sectoral analysis, the
economic sector dominated the discussions, as noted in a statement prior to
the meeting by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada,
“I look forward to meeting with President Obama and President Peña
Nieto to make real progress on the challenges we collectively face—
whether how we can expand trade between our nations, build

also Fernando Camacho y César Arellano, “Ante ‘falta de resultados’, padres de los 43
realizanplantónindefinido en la PGR,” La Jornada,April 4, 2017, available at:
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2017/04/21/politica/005n1pol.
66 Information presented by panelists from the United States, Canada, and Mexico during
a panel titled, “Public Safety and Health Cooperation,” at a conference titled, Trilateral
Security in North America: New Dimensions and Approaches, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC (March 12, 2010).
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competitive clean growth economies, or create real help for middleclass families.”67
At the Summit the three leaders agreed to pursue “economic competitiveness;
expand our efforts on climate change, clean energy, and the environment;
solidify our regional and global cooperation; and strengthen our security and
defense.”68 Much of the focus by President Obama was on gaining support for
his climate change and environmental initiatives, particularly focused on
clean energy. One of the few tangible agreements reached at the Summit was
an Action Plan to promote this agenda.69
Security was included at the Summit, with topics on the agenda, such as:
Central American violence, corruption, and migration; drug, arms, and
human trafficking; trusted traveler and border security; health security; and
regional concerns such as supporting the peace process in Colombia and
peacekeeping efforts in Haiti. Another security concern on the agenda, which
crossed multiple sectors, was cooperation in cyberspace. This was particularly
evident in the discussions regarding energy security and the recognition that
all three countries’ growing interconnectivity with the North American power
grid posed an area of increased vulnerability to all three countries. As stated
in the Action Plan, “Our three countries are committed to deepened electric
reliability cooperation to strengthen the security and resilience of an
increasingly integrated North American electricity grid against the growing
threats presented by cyber-attacks and severe weather events.”70
Although Action Plans, and other shared agendas which come out meetings
such as the North American Leader’s Summit rarely produce concrete policy
decisions or institutional structures, the fact that the Summit did take place
was, in itself, a significant event given some of the contentious issues
impacting the three countries. Canada was scheduled to host the meeting in
2015; however, it was cancelled due to a contentious issue over Canadian visa
Prime Minister of Canada, “North American Leaders to Meet in Ottawa in June 2016,”
May 4, 2016, available at: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/05/04/north-americanleaders-meet-ottawa-june-2016.
68 White House, “FACT SHEET: United States Key Deliverables for the 2016 North
American Leaders’ Summit,” news release, June 19, 2016, available at:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/29/fact-sheet-united-stateskey-deliverables-2016-north-american-leaders.
69 White House, “North American Climate, Clean Energy, and Environment Partnership
Action Plan,” news release, June 19, 2016, available at:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/29/north-american-climateclean-energy-and-environment-partnership-action.
70 White House, “North American Climate.”
67
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requirements for Mexican travelers (due to the high number of Mexicans
arriving in Canada requesting refugee status), as well as a fallout between
Canada and the United States over the failed Keystone XL Pipeline contract.71
With the change in leadership in Canada from the conservative party of
Stephen Harper, to the liberal party of Justin Trudeau, Canada was seeking to
reengage with both the United States and Mexico in a trilateral forum to
discuss shared North American issues, but not to recreate the Security and
Prosperity Partnership. Trudeau made it clear during a visit to Washington,
D.C. in March 2016 that he viewed the U.S.-Canadian security relationship as
a special bilateral alliance, which allowed for increased cooperation on border
security and intelligence sharing.72 This position echoes earlier sentiments
voiced by Canadian military personnel who did not want to water down the
unique Canadian-United States security relationship in order to bring Mexico
into the NORAD structure or even the 5-eyes intelligence partnership.73

From 2005 until 2008, the number of Mexican citizens traveling to Canada and
requesting refugee status has tripled, from 3,400 to over 9,400. Citizenship and
Immigration Canada (2009), “Backgrounder–The Visa Requirement for Mexico,”
available at:
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/backgrounders/2009/2009-07-13.asp.
The Keystone XL Pipeline was a proposed oil pipeline that would allow Canadian oil to
transit the United States to oil refining sites in Texas along the Gulf Coast. Environmental
groups opposed it and the proposed legislation authorizing the agreement was eventually
vetoed by President Obama. Coral Davenport, “Citing Climate Change, President Obama
Rejects Keystone XL Pipeline,” New York Times, November 6, 2015, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/us/obama-expected-to-reject-construction-ofkeystone-xl-oil-pipeline.html?_r=0.
72 John Paul Tasker and Rosemary Barton, “Trudeau, Obama to Announce Expansion of
Border Pre-Clearance Program,” CBC News, March 9, 2016, available at:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/trudeau-obama-preclearance-1.3484339.
73 Five eyes refers to the 5 English-speaking countries of Canada, United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Under Air Force General Gene Renuart,
USNORTHCOM sought to integrate Mexican military personnel into the NORAD
structure, and expand the air defense agreement of NORAD into Maritime and Landbased defense agreements. Canada balked at any agreement that would bring Mexico in
as an equal partner (Personal conversations of one of the authors with Canadian military
personnel); Christian Leuprecht makes the argument that Canada and the United States
have the most solid relationship in defense on earth, although, in the case of Canada, the
United States and Mexico, the latter lacks a common regional strategic concept in North
America since World War II; This is correct on defense issues, Mexico is introverted and
mainly dedicated to internal security. Historically, Mexico has seen and external defense
only in case of a war and more recently with Hurracaine Katrina. See Christian Leuprecht,
“Complejidades al generar un equilibrio de seguridad trilateral enAmérica del Norte:
Acercamiento de las culturasen las relacionesciviles-militares” in Abelardo Rodríguez
Sumano, Agendas Comunes y diferenciasen la seguridad de América del Norte, ¿de
dóndevenimos?), ¿dóndeestamos? y, ¿a dóndequeremosir? (Centro de
EstudiosSuperioresNavales de la Armada de México-Universidad de Guadalajara, 2012,
pp.331-342).
71
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The US Presidential Election and Identity Politics
As special, as the Canada–US relationship is the election of Donald Trump as
President of the United States in November 2016 has ruffled more than a few
feathers in the bilateral cap. Anti-immigration rhetoric in the United States
has resulted in a flow of migrants north bound into Canada never seen before.
Migrants arriving at the border have told officials that fear of being deported
from the United States has motivated them to make the trek, in some cases in
dangerous winter conditions, to Canada.74 On the economic front challenges
to the Canadian softwood, lumber industry has recently resulted in a
substantial increase on tariffs on softwood lumber crossing from Canada to
the United States.75 As well, a challenge launched by Boeing against Canadian
plane manufacturer Bombardier will likely result in a change the way business
is done in that sector.76 At the same time, Prime Minister Trudeau clearly
stated his position that he will defend Canadian interests first.
Finally, in a major speech on June 6, 2017, Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs roundly rejected the nationalistic view touted
south of the Canadian border. In its stead, she stated that Canada would
assume a major leadership role in the world.77 Canada’s commitment to
assume command of NATO troops in Latvia is one such example of Canada’s
new global role.
Prior to Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto’s arrival in Canada, there was
still some residual effects of the Edward Snowden revelations, regarding the
National Security Agency’s intelligence collection programs, which targeted
world leaders, to include the Mexican president.78 When these reports first
surfaced in 2013, it led to a breakdown in trust between Mexican and US
intelligence agencies, which had been cooperating on counterdrug operations.
Allan Woods, “Illegal Border Crossings into Canada Continue to Rise,” The Toronto
Star, April 19, 2017, available at:
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/04/19/illegal-border-crossings-intocanada-continue-to-rise.html.
75 Alexander Panetta and Ross Marowits, “Trump Slaps 20% Tariff on Canadian Lumber,”
The Toronto Sun, April 24, 2017, available at:
http://www.torontosun.com/2017/04/24/trump-slaps-20-tariff-on-canadian-lumber.
76 Ross Marowits, “Boeing to Trump: End Bombardier’s Illegal, Unfair Business
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Because of the Merida Initiative begun under the George W. Bush and Felipe
Calderón administrations, intelligence fusion centers had been set up in
Mexico, to include the US Embassy in Mexico City, as an unprecedented
means by which Mexican and US intelligence agencies could share
information to target Mexican drug kingpins, like Joaquín Guzmán Loera.79
United States intelligence and security cooperation with Mexico included the
presence of U.S.-piloted drones and military advisors in Mexico, providing
intelligence support to Mexican military and law enforcement agencies
targeting Mexican drug cartels. When Peña Nieto came into power in Mexico
in 2012, and his new national security team learned of the extent of the
United States presence in Mexico, the new Mexican administration scaled
back its cooperation with US intelligence agencies, taking a more traditional
hardline in United States-Mexican security relations.80 They also cancelled
seminars at the trilateral level and excluded personal and academic exchanges
between Mexican academics who had relationships with US government
officials. The Mexican government also went so far as to further restrict
intelligence sharing between the militaries of the two countries, limiting
intelligence cooperation to only those agreements exclusively under control of
the Secretary of the Interior (Gobernación). Despite these official statements
coming from the Mexican government, the actual military-to-military contact
between Mexico and the United States actually became stronger under Peña
Nieto. Thus, the security cooperation transformed. It was not cancelled.
A small expression of amity between Mexico and the United States occurred
after the second escape of Joaquín Guzmán Loera from Mexican prisons in
2015. The United States had been pushing for Guzmán’s extradition to stand
trial in the United States, rather than Mexico, due to corruption of Mexico’s
judicial system, ever since his capture in 2014 (with the help of US
intelligence support). President Peña Nieto appeared more open to the
possibility of extraditing Guzmán to the United States to stand trial after his
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recapture in January 2016, as long as the United States would ensure he
would not receive the death penalty.81
Despite the success of the kingpin strategy in Mexico and United States
support in helping Mexico capture the leaders of most of Mexico’s most
powerful drug cartels, there is no evidence that drug trafficking to the United
States has decreased, or that the security situation in Mexican has improved.
In fact, some evidence points to an increase in drug-related violence and
homicides in Mexico since Peña Nieto’s administration came to power in
2012.82 Sources in Mexico state that the number of assassinations per day has
increased to 57, a 300 per cent increase since 2012.83 Mexico continues to
insist that drug-related violence is simply a matter of supply and demand, and
until the United States does something to curb the demand for drugs, there is
little Mexico can do to decrease the supply.84 This has led former Mexican
president Vicente Fox to come out in favor of decriminalizing drug use in
Mexico, which he feels would help end the drug war and violence.85 Although
individual states in the United States have legalized marijuana, there is no
national consensus to change the nation’s current counterdrug policies and
legalize drug use.
The latest enmity to emerge in U.S.-Mexican relations has come from the
November 2016 presidential election of Republican nominee Donald Trump,
who used the politics of identity to target undocumented immigration and the
insecurity of the U.S.-Mexican border. Threatening to “build a great wall
along the southern border….And Mexico will pay for the wall,” Trump’s
campaign elevated hostility toward Mexico and Mexican immigrants living in
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the United States (both documented and undocumented) throughout the
campaign. Since his election, Trump still views Mexico as a security threat to
the United States, making such pronouncements that the United States
should have invaded Mexico in 2003, rather than Iraq.86 In 2016, Mexican
president Peña Nieto responded to the possibility of a Trump presidency as a
serious threat to Mexico, having a damaging effect on U.S.-Mexican
relations.87 In addition to immigration, Trump’s campaign rhetoric also
targeted U.S.-Mexican economic relations, particularly noting NAFTA,
blaming Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton’s husband, former President
Bill Clinton who Trump says, “signed NAFTA, which destroyed this country
economically, I will tell you. You look at New York state (sic), you look all over
New England, you look at Pennsylvania, NAFTA was a disaster, (sic) her
husband signed it. And it was a disaster for this country.”88
While, for Mexico, Trump is the national security threat and his
administration is informing Mexico that he wants to end up with a new vision
of North America. Trump also has revived an old Mexican nationalism and
has challenged so dramatically the national conscience and identity in terms
of its interdependent relationship at least since the end of the MexicanAmerica War of 1847. Today more than ever before, the Mexican Armed
Forces, particularly the Army, is more nationalistic and more concerned over
United States intentions toward Mexico.
On July 20, 2016, after the Ottawa Summit, President Obama and President
Peña Nieto met for bilateral talks in Washington, DC. The focus of their
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meeting was to try to diffuse the negative rhetoric coming from the Trump
campaign toward Mexico, and emphasize the importance of the bilateral ties
between the two nations, particularly with regard to economic cooperation.
One area highlighted in the meeting was the High Level Economic Dialog
(HLED) established in 2013, where cabinet-level officials of each country have
been meeting regularly to discuss ways to increase economic integration
between the two countries.89 Both Obama and Peña Nieto wanted the HLED
to continue after January 20, 2017, when the expected new Democratic US
president, Hillary Clinton, assumed office. She was part of that dialog as
Secretary of State and would likely continue the HLED under her term.
Since Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2017, there have been no
further HLED discussions. In fact, President Peña Nieto cancelled a state visit
to the United States scheduled for February due to the continued rift over
Trump’s promise to build a border wall and have Mexico pay for it.90 The
Trump administration continues to insist on renegotiating NAFTA with both
Canada and Mexico, to correct the perceived unfair trade practices which
Trump claims make the United States the big loser in the North American
trade relationship.91
In reaction to Trump’s rhetoric, the debates have been dramatic: from
confrontation to silence. For example, former leftist presidential candidate,
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas has raised centuries-old claims of a recuperation of
Texas, California, Arizona, and New Mexico. Jorge G. Castañeda, former
Minister of Foreign Relations, has argued that Mexico should finish its
cooperation with the United States on confronting drug cartels, border
security, and terrorism. While Mexican government officials and President
Peña Nieto remain quiet and extremely cautious about the new White House,
Mexico is experiencing three major challenges internally: a week presidency;
extreme violence related to organized crime; and much uncertain about the
country’s relationship with the United States under Trump’s administration.
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Conclusion
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 created the conditions upon which the nations of
North America (Canada, Mexico, and the United States) appeared to be
building a North American security complex by creating institutions, sharing
interests, and overcoming identity issues, which divided the three countries.
It was the insecurity of the dominant regional power, the United States, which
fostered an increased dialog and engagement that went beyond traditional
security issues to include social, economic, political, and environmental
concerns. The process of securitization across these various sectors, described
by Buzan and Waever in Regional Security Complex Theory, provided an
explanatory value in understanding how these three countries could develop
institutions, based on shared interests to face the security threats posed in a
post 9/11 world. Even those barriers formed by identity, which had
traditionally extended beyond borders which created enmity between states,
appeared to be weakening. The region appeared to be closer to living out what
Robert Pastor called “The North American Idea,” where he envisioned a
constructed future for the region with a new continental identity.92 That
argument today appears almost dead or at least on life support.
Today, there is a retrenchment of interests along national lines, where the
countries pursue security relations either unilaterally or at best bilaterally in
North America. Venues (like the North American Leaders Summits) which
previously offered opportunities for trilateral engagement on security issues
no longer carry a sense of urgency or even promise for any substantive change
in cooperation in any sector, even economic cooperation.93 United States
President Donald Trump has elevated the politics of identity to new levels in
the United States with his populist rhetoric, which continues after the election
campaign. His relationship with a Republican-controlled Congress is tenuous
at best and his administration continues to face both Congressional and
independent inquiries into its relationship with Russian officials before the
election. While some members of Congress have gone so far as to call for
Trump impeachment, at a minimum the allegations of wrongdoing will
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continue to affect the legitimacy and credibility of the American presidency.94
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto faces his own domestic political crises,
which also limit his ability to propose any new security initiatives in the last
year of his administration. Only Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau
appears to have any real political stake in the outcome of a new North
American Leaders Summit, which he could parley into some domestic
advantage, particularly on economic or energy policies.
While Regional Security Complex Theory argues that among the members of
a Security Complex a group of countries or just two neighbor countries can
develop converge toward threats or divergence like in the case of North and
South Korea. In North America, what initially appeared to be a convergence of
interests, particularly with regard to security and threats after 9/11, now
appears to be diverging due to the role of identity politics. The questions are
for how long, is it a permanent trend, or is it just the beginning of a new era in
North American relationships?
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